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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MEDICAID AT THIRTY-FIVE

SARA ROSENBAUM* AND DAVID ROUSSEAU**

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article presents a broad overview of Medicaid, the nation’s largest
means-tested health care financing program. In an era of health policy ferment
(as all eras of U.S. public policy) this article is intended to give readers a sense
of Medicaid’s place within the health system as a whole, the essential markettranscendent functions it performs, the modernization challenges that it faces,
and the prospects for reform. The immediate impetus for this article was a
symposium on Medicaid conducted in March 2000 by the Saint Louis
University School of Law. The observations offered here reflect years of
ongoing discussions with many scholars who have studied Medicaid’s
immense contributions and major shortcomings.1

* Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor, Health Law and Policy, The George Washington University,
School of Public Health and Health Services, Washington D.C. Correspondence should be
addressed to Professor Rosenbaum.
** Policy Analyst, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation, Washington D.C.
1. Over the course of many years, Professor Rosenbaum has benefited greatly from her
association with a number of people who have thought deeply about Medicaid. A relatively
recent convert to the close-knit world of people entranced by Medicaid policy, Mr. Rousseau has
benefited from these associations as well. In particular we would like to acknowledge the work
of the members and staff of the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (specifically,
its Chair, James Tallon, Drew Altman, President of the Foundation, Diane Rowland, Executive
Vice President and Director of the Commission, and Barbara Lyons, the Commission’s Associate
Director), Andy Schneider, Esq., whose knowledge of the program is unparalleled, and Patricia
Riley, President of the National Academy for State Health Policy (and a member of the Kaiser
Commission) for her guidance over the years on state Medicaid dynamics. We also would like to
acknowledge Dr. John Holahan and the rest of the health policy group at the Urban Institute,
whose statistical studies of the Medicaid program not only support the work of the Kaiser
Commission (and are presented in this article) but also have become a basic building block of
Medicaid policy making. Finally, Professor Rosenbaum wishes to thank James Weill, Director of
the Food Research and Action Center in Washington D.C. and Professor David Chavkin of
American University, Washington College of Law, both of whom helped Professor Rosenbaum
take the Medicaid plunge in the early years and whose early work on behalf of program
beneficiaries is still recognized today.
7
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Part II opens this article with an overview of Medicaid’s place in the
modern health system and the multiple roles it plays. Part III presents a legal
and statistical overview of Medicaid. The article concludes in Part IV with an
analysis of the major challenges that confront the program and the prospects
for reform.
In brief, we argue here that even though Medicaid is in tremendous need of
modernization, its continuation as a federal legal entitlement to a range of
health services, which surpass what is available under conventional insurance,
is critical to the very survival of the nation’s market-driven health system.
Medicaid is the means by which public policy makers have stabilized Medicaid
financing and the foundation on which the system flourishes. In our view, it is
possible to imagine the national health scheme without Medicaid only at the
point when policy makers choose to move the American health system off of
its market-principle base and onto a comprehensive social insurance platform
with universal coverage. Since policy makers do not show any indication that
they are inclined to undertake such a momentous shift in health policy
thinking, the modernization of Medicaid becomes essential.
II. MEDICAID AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH SYSTEM
Building on previous public assistance programs, Medicaid began as a
modest legislative companion to Medicare2 and has come to occupy a singular
position in American health policy.
Simultaneously lauded for its
achievements in improving health care access for low income and medically
vulnerable persons3 and heavily criticized for its structural deficiencies and
immense size,4 Medicaid at thirty-five is far more important to the American
health care system than it was at the time of its original enactment. The
seminal question is whether Medicaid can be modernized without sacrificing
its core strength as an individually enforceable legal entitlement program for
low income and medically indigent persons.
With prospects for the enactment of comprehensive national health
insurance so limited,5 Medicaid reform can be expected to be a dominant and

2. See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A
CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 42-51 (1974) [hereinafter WELFARE MEDICINE].
3. Mark L. Berk & Claudia L. Shur, Access to Care: How Much Difference Does Medicaid
Make?, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1998, at 169-80.
4. See, e.g., THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, THE BASICS: MEDICAID REFORM: WHAT’S
WRONG WITH MEDICAID? 1, available at http://www.tcf.org/publications/Basics/medicaid/
Whats_Wrong.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
5. As of the summer of 2000, health reform had once again emerged as a major issue in the
Presidential race. Both candidates had fashioned health proposals, which, while different in
certain significant respects, were incremental in nature in that they attempted to address the need
for coverage of various pockets of uninsured individuals rather than replacing the existing
pluralistic system of coverage in the U.S. with a single national policy and legislative scheme.
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recurrent theme in the coming years. This continued interest in Medicaid
reflects the extraordinary policy attention that the program has received since
its inception. Over the past three decades, Medicaid has served as a legislative
vehicle for an astonishing range of medical and public health initiatives
including: the reduction of infant mortality and improvement of child health
among low income women and children;6 the improvement of communitybased long-term care services for the frail elderly, and children and adults with
physical and mental disabilities;7 the provision of insurance coverage for low
income working families8 and persons with disabilities who return to work;9
assistance to the lower income Medicare beneficiaries without the means to
purchase private supplemental insurance;10 the development of a public
childhood vaccine purchasing system to assure an adequate supply of pediatric
vaccines for low income and uninsured children;11 initiatives to improve the
treatment of persons with HIV/AIDS12 and tuberculosis;13 the reform of the

Elizabeth White & Kurt Fernandez, Bush and Gore Vary on Health Care Policy Issues, 8 BNA
HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT, Aug. 14, 2000, at 1385. It is worth noting, moreover, that even
in the Clinton Administration’s national health reform plan, which would in fact have replaced
existing public and private insurance arrangements with a single legislative scheme, the
Administration elected to preserve various components of Medicaid that provide coverage for
long-term care as well as additional services for children and adults with chronic illnesses and
conditions. See generally The Health Security Act, S. 1757, 103d Cong. (1993). The ongoing
need for Medicaid benefits and services even following the presumed enactment of national
health reform is a testament to the program’s capacity to address issues that fall outside of
normative concepts of health insurance, a matter discussed at length in this article.
6. Between 1984 and 1990, Congress expanded Medicaid on seven separate occasions to
expand eligibility for pregnant women, infants and children and to improve coverage for
maternity and pediatric care. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid Expansions and Access to Care, in
MEDICAID FINANCING CRISIS: BALANCING RESPONSIBILITIES, PRIORITIES, AND DOLLARS 45, 48
(Diane Rowaland et al. eds., 1993).
7. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS (A 1993 UPDATE) 800, 816, 873
(Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK].
8. Medicaid was amended to add an extended transitional work program for families
making the welfare to work transition. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
9. ANDY SCHNEIDER & RISA ELLBERGER, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND
THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID-RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE TICKET TO WORK AND WORK
INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1999 2 (PUB. L. 106-170) (2000), available at
http://www.kff.org.
10. Social Security Act §1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(X), 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(X) (1994).
11. Social Security Act §1928(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. §1396s(a)(1)(A) (1994).
12. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 1093-94. For a comprehensive review of
Medicaid and HIV/AIDS, see TIMOTHY WESTMORELAND, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID AND HIV/AIDS POLICY (1999), available at
http://www.kff.org.
13. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XII), (z), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XII),
(z) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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nursing home industry;14 the establishment of managed care systems for
beneficiaries with both basic and complex physical and mental health care
needs;15 aid to “safety-net” hospitals and clinics that serve large numbers of
poor and uninsured patients;16 and coverage of women with breast and cervical
cancer.17 Indeed, the evolution of Medicaid, captured in Figure 1, makes clear
that even a partial summary of Medicaid’s amendments since its original
enactment underscores its policy significance.18
Figure 1

Medicaid Milestones, 1965-1997
40

Millions of Medicaid Beneficiaries

(35 Million
Beneficiaries in
1997)

Medicare QMBs
(1988)

30
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NOTE: Beneficiaries include only those individuals for whom payments were made and
therefore sums to a lower total than enrollees on other slides.
SOURCE: Health Care Financing Administration, 1998; Rosenbaum S., 1993; Rowland, D.,
1992, prepared by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.
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14. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 854-55.
15. Social Security Act § 1932(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
16. This assistance has taken two basic forms. First, hospitals that serve a “disproportionate
number” of Medicaid and low income individuals are entitled to receive additional payments.
Social Security Act §1902(a)(13), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Second,
clinics that receive federal funding under the Public Health Service Act, as well as certain other
clinical entities that meet PHS Act standards, are classified as “federally qualified health centers”
under the law and are entitled to receive cost-related reimbursement for the covered services they
furnish to Medicaid beneficiaries. Social Security Act § 1905(a)(2)(C), (l)(2)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(a)(2)(C), (l)(2)(A)-(B) (1994). For an extended analysis of the relationship between safety
net providers and Medicaid, see INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SAFETY
NET: INTACT BUT ENDANGERED 1 (Marion Ein Lewin & Stuart Altman eds., 2000). For a review
of state disproportionate share payment policies see Teresa A. Coughlin & David Liska,
Changing State and Federal Payment Policies for Medicaid Disproportionate-Share Hospitals,
HEALTH AFF., May-June 1998, at 118.
17. Breast and Cervical Cancer Prevention and Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-354,
114 Stat. 1381 (2000).
18. See Figure 1.
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Beyond its role as a vehicle for national health priority initiatives,
Medicaid has served as a policy and programmatic springboard for state-based
health reform efforts under special waivers by the federal government of
otherwise applicable federal Medicaid law.19 These health reform efforts have
not always been without controversy;20 however, they have succeeded in
moving Medicaid into the modern managed care era. Furthermore, Medicaid
has achieved greater levels of health coverage among uninsured low income
working families21 and, thus, had encouraged policy makers to reconceptualize
Medicaid beyond its original roots as a companion to cash welfare assistance
and a source of financing for medically indigent persons who fall outside the
workforce.22
Part of the explanation for the frequency with which Medicaid has been
used to address significant health policy issues lies in the fact that, from its
inception, the program has been associated with the provision of care to the
poor and underserved.23 As a result, policy makers have logically turned to
Medicaid as the need to address problems affecting vulnerable populations
arose.
In our view, however, the program’s ongoing role as a legislative
powerhouse for public health policy extends beyond mere temporal legislative
convenience. Medicaid’s ability to adapt itself to such a broad range of health
needs stems from the fact that despite its legendary complexity,24 the program

19. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers: Charting a Path for Medicaid
Managed Care Reform, in THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: PROMISES AND PROSPECTS FOR LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 179, 18182 (Marsha Lillie-Blanton et al. eds., 1999), available at http://www.kff.org.
20. See Leighton Ku et al., Medicaid Managed Care Programs in Hawaii, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, and Tennessee, in REMAKING MEDICAID: MANAGED CARE FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD 147
(Steve Davidson & Stephen Somers eds., 1998).
21. Id. at 162.
22. WELFARE MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 51-53, 57-61.
23. Id. at 57.
24. In its seminal study of the Medicaid program, the Congressional Research Service notes
that “[t]o many the program [Medicaid] is an enigma.” MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7,
at vii. Medicaid has been the subject of numerous outbursts by federal courts, aghast at the
complexity of the law. See, e.g., Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1976) which noted
Medicaid’s “statutory provisions and HEW regulations of labyrinthine complexity.” Id. at 727.
The court included the following memorable footnote in its decision: “As program after program
has evolved, there has developed a degree of complexity in the Social Security Act and
particularly the regulations which makes them almost unintelligible to the uninitiated. There
should be no such form of reference as ‘45 C.F.R. § 248.3(c)(1)(ii)(B)(2)’ discussed below; a
draftsman who has gotten himself into a position requiring anything like this should make a fresh
start. Such unintelligibility is doubly unfortunate in the case of a statute dealing with the rights of
poor people. An indispensable service is performed by attorneys like those representing the
plaintiffs here, who advance tenable claims with clarity and courtesy even if, as in this case, not
with success.” Id. at 728 n.7.
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is extraordinarily simple in structure when compared to conventional
insurance. Medicaid can be thought of as a structured flow of federal funds
that permits health care expenditures for populations who, because of poverty,
health risks or health status, lie outside of conventional insurance.25 In a real
sense, Medicaid has saved the nation’s market-based health system through its
ability to provide generous levels of funding for national health priorities that
exist beyond the furthest reaches of the market.
Moreover, Medicaid is exquisitely protean in nature. This flexibility flows
from the fact that it operates outside of, and in direct contrast to, the principles
and conventions of health insurance,26 although individuals who are legally
entitled to coverage are counted as insured for statistical purposes.27 This
distinction between Medicaid and health insurance shows up in three critically
important ways.
The first is eligibility for coverage. Because it is not concerned with
“risk,” Medicaid does not restrict coverage to persons with insurable risks;
indeed, it invites in the sickest and most disabled members of society. Unlike
private health insurance28 or Medicare,29 Medicaid contains neither preexisting condition exclusion clauses nor waiting periods.30 Numerous

25. By conventional insurance, we mean insurance products that are sold commercially and
that operate on the basis of actuarial risk principles. See Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the
Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & LAW 287 (1993).
26. Deborah Stone’s article, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, offers an
excellent and succinct comparison of social versus commercial insurance and eloquently
describes the conflict between the concept of actuarial fairness (also known as “fair
discrimination”) that underlies commercial coverage and the needs of individuals who for reasons
of social and health risk factors require health care at levels greater than the norm. See id. at 29094. For an additional discussion of the concept of “fair discrimination” see RAND E.
ROSENBLATT, SYLVIA A. LAW & SARA ROSENBAUM, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 207-09 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter LAW AND THE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM].
27. For example, the United States Census Bureau classifies individuals with Medicaid as
insured. See, e.g., JENNIFER A. CAMPBELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
1998: CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 6 fig.6-7 (1999).
28. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) limited, but
did not prohibit, the use of pre-existing condition and exclusion clauses from employer-sponsored
group health plans. See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1939 (codified as amended 29 U.S.C.
1181) (amending ERISA to limiting both the duration of the “look-back” period for preexisting
condition exclusion clauses under group health plans as well as the allowable length of the
exclusionary period).
29. The Medicare statute imposes a twenty-four-month waiting period on individuals who
qualify for coverage by virtue of disability status. Social Security Act § 1811, 42 U.S.C. §1395c
(1994).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Medicaid eligibility is conditioned
solely on the criteria described in this article. The statute does not impose waiting periods or
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eligibility categories are specifically designed to target persons with high
health risks including children who need long-term care, persons with
tuberculosis, children and women with HIV/AIDS, the frail elderly and
persons with disabilities.31
The second distinction between Medicaid and insurance relates to benefits.
The services and benefits made available under the program are not limited to
those found in a typical commercial insurance benefit package. In contrast to
conventional insurance, covered benefits extend well into the realm of longterm care and include such interventions as personal care services, respite care,
home care adaptation and case management.32
The third, and perhaps most overlooked distinction has to do with the
standards by which coverage decisions are made under the program. In light
of the fact that its origins lie with a population of workers, conventional
insurance typically limits actual coverage for enumerated benefits to items and
services that are necessary to “restore normal functioning” following an
“illness or injury.”33 This standard, which may be appropriate for most
members of working families, can fall with great harshness on children and
adults with chronic illnesses and disabilities,34 particularly disabilities that are
tied to conditions, such as cerebral palsy or other congenital problems, that are
neither an “illness” nor an “injury.” In applying this standard to persons with
chronic illnesses and disabilities, insurers may deny coverage altogether
because their conditions place them outside of the contractual conditions of
coverage.35
exclude coverage for certain conditions. Indeed, federal regulations expressly prohibit
discrimination on the basis of a condition in coverage for required services.
31. See the categorical eligibility groupings identified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I)(XII) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
32. See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at vii. Federal law requires participating
states to provide certain classes of “medical assistance” to individuals who are entitled to
coverage and gives states the option to extend coverage for many additional classes of medical
assistance. Certain types of services commonly associated with long-term care, such as nursing
home services, are mandatory. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a)(xii)(4) (1994). Other
types of services, such as the services of personal attendants and case management, are optional.
33. LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra note 26.
34. Individuals with disabilities cannot recover from their conditions, even though they may
be able to attain or maintain certain functional status or may benefit from health care in the sense
that their health status does not deteriorate further. See Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d
149, 151 (4th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that however laudable may be the goals of functional
improvement and prevention of deterioration, they lie beyond the reaches of contractual insurance
limits. Id.
35. The impact of this standard can best be seen in Bedrick, in which an insurer completely
denied coverage for physical therapy in the case of a child with severe cerebral palsy because in
the view of the insurer there was no hope that a child with this condition could benefit from
therapy. Id. at 151. In a remarkable opinion holding that the conduct of the insurer was arbitrary
and capricious, the appeals court reversed significant portions of the decision. Id. at 154.
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Consistent with the populations it covers and the services it furnishes,
Medicaid contains no such limitations. Federal law makes it unlawful to
discriminate in the provision of required services on the basis of a condition.36
As a result, state Medicaid programs must adopt medically reasonable
coverage limits37 and must extend medically necessary services and benefits
they cover to any beneficiary, regardless of whether the need for the service is
related to a chronic condition or a completely correctable illness or injury.38
For these three basic reasons, Medicaid stands wholly apart from
commercial insurance conventions. The result is an ability to respond to
national health policy priorities whose resolution extends beyond the limits of
conventional insurance. These three principal distinctions between Medicaid
and insurance also underscore the implications to the entire health system were
Medicaid to disappear. Although there is an enormous need to modernize
Medicaid, if the program were to cease to operate in its current basic form as a
legal entitlement to coverage, the number of uninsured Americans would
skyrocket from forty-four million to a number approaching seventy million.39
Furthermore, billions of dollars in public financing for non-insurable services,
ranging from long-term nursing home care to extended community and
outpatient services for children and adults with chronic illnesses and
disabilities, would be at stake.40
Medicaid’s importance extends far beyond the populations it covers and
the services it underwrites. The program is fundamental to the economic
health of state and local governments. This is because the statute entitles states
to open-ended federal financing toward both the medical and administrative
costs of Medicaid, with federal contribution levels for medical assistance costs
that range from fifty percent to nearly seventy-seven percent of total
expenditures in fiscal year (“FY”) 2000.41 Because Medicaid expenditures

Because so few denials by insurers ever reach court at all, much less a federal appeals court, one
can only surmise the frequency with which this type of standard is applied.
36. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (1999).
37. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (1999).
38. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (1999).
39. As of 1998, 44.3 million Americans were uninsured. THE KAISER COMMISSION ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, UNINSURED IN AMERICA: A CHART BOOK 12 (2000), available
at http://www.kff.org. Approximately twenty-three million non-elderly Americans had Medicaid
coverage in 1997. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HEALTH, UNITED STATES 2000, 340 tbl.128 (2000).
Assuming that nearly all of these individuals would be otherwise uninsured in the absence of
Medicaid, the number of uninsured would rise considerably.
40. See infra Figure 9, which shows that 74% of all spending under Medicaid is for services
and benefits that are other than preventive and acute care services for non-disabled working age
adults and non-disabled children.
41. ANDY SCHNEIDER & DAVID ROUSSEAU, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND
THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID FINANCING 19 (2000), available at http://www.kff.org.
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comprise the majority of total state spending on health care, this level of
federal financial participation provides major aid to states in meeting the
overall cost of medical care, which is by far the fastest growing portion of their
public welfare budgets.42 To be sure, states must comply with extensive
federal requirements as a condition of receiving federal payments, the most
important of which relates to their obligations toward program beneficiaries.43
At the same time, federal Medicaid payments are so substantial that Medicaid
funding has evolved into one of the essential pillars of states’ economies.
Even the lure of a 1995 Congressional proposal, as part of welfare reform, to
“block grant” Medicaid and strip out all legal requirements and protections in
exchange for an aggregate fixed upper limit on federal contributions to state
programs pegged to the general inflation rate, failed in the end and was
removed from the final legislation.44
Medicaid is essential to a triumvirate of stakeholders, including the states
that are entitled to federal payments on an open-ended basis, participating
health care providers that are entitled to payment for the covered services they
furnish to program beneficiaries, and the individuals who have an enforceable
legal entitlement to coverage.45 Although their interests frequently tend to
sharply diverge, particularly in the case of initiatives to mandate coverage
expansion or payment reforms, this group of stakeholders has coexisted for
thirty-five years. Historically, this core Medicaid stakeholder group has been
supplemented, at least informally, by considerable public support for the
program by the commercial health insurance industry46 as well as by

42. Over the past decade, state spending on public welfare services has grown faster than the
gross domestic product (GDP) or the rate of growth in per capita revenues. While the entire
public welfare component grew by seventy-one percent, vendor payments to health care providers
grew by 111% over the same time period. DAVID MERRIMAN, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, WHAT
ACCOUNTS FOR THE GROWTH OF STATE GOVERNMENT BUDGETS IN THE 1990s? 1, 3 tbl.2 (Series
A No.39) (2000), available at http://www.urban.org.
43. See generally MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 1-20 (summarizing the basic
requirements of the program).
44. The Medicaid block grant legislation was originally a part of the same legislative vehicle
that contained the welfare reform legislation. See Sara Rosenbaum & Kathleen A. Maloy, The
Law of Unintended Consequences: The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act and its Impact on Medicaid for Families with Children, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443,
1443 (1999) [hereinafter The Law of Unintended Consequences].
45. While decisions by the Supreme Court have in recent years limited the ability of
individuals to claim an enforceable right to benefits under various Social Security Act programs,
as a general rule the federal courts have continued to recognize the enforceability of the Medicaid
statute. LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 253-62 (1999-2000
Supp.).
46. For example, the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) has traditionally
called for Medicaid expansions as part of its national health reform proposals. HIAA’s current
proposal contains Medicaid expansions. HIAA Press Releases, HIAA Is Fortune’s Top Health

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

16

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:7

employers and insurance purchasers. While the support of insurers and
employers has been valuable to the success of the program and the enactment
of specific legislative reforms,47 their interest in a strong Medicaid program
has not been purely altruistic. Were Medicaid not to exist, private interests
conceivably could face a far more difficult policy and regulatory environment
in the absence of a program that is capable of absorbing the billions of dollars
in annual health care expenditure responsibilities that lie outside of the
marketplace.
At the same time that Medicaid enjoys both explicit and tacit support, it is
precisely this sea of interest that makes it so difficult to achieve structural
improvements in light of the divergent views regarding the wisdom or value of
program modification. The cost of modernizing Medicaid would be relatively
significant. As a result, the constraints of the federal budget process itself
create additional impediments to reform. Finally, the obvious need, for the
reasons stated above, for a health care financing mechanism that operates
outside the principles of insurance, expanding and strengthening Medicaid can
be viewed as tantamount to an admission of “market failure.” For those who
advocate a pure market approach to health reform, for example the use of
vouchers or tax credits to aid in the purchase of private insurance or the greater
deductibility for out-of-pocket expenditures on health care, a Medicaid
expansion would be precisely the wrong remedy. For all of these reasons,
Medicaid struggles forward, long on achievements but burdened by serious
deficiencies that significantly hamper the program’s effectiveness.
III. A LEGAL AND STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF MEDICAID
In order to understand Medicaid’s role, it is necessary to have a basic
understanding of program structure and design, and to be familiar with at least
basic statistical data illustrating the program’s operations in the areas of
enrollment coverage and program expenditures. Even the limited overview of
Medicaid presented in this article underscores its complexity, size and potential
impact on health care.
A.

Program Structure

Medicaid, the largest of all means-tested entitlement laws, is a federal
grant-in-aid program that entitles individuals who meet its eligibility

Insurance Trade Assn. for 3rd Consecutive Year (Nov. 15, 1999), at http://www.hiaa.org/news/
news-current/press-releases/release110.html.
47. Professor Rosenbaum notes that in her previous position as director of the Health
Division at the Children’s Defense Fund (“CDF”) in Washington D.C., CDF routinely sought and
received the enthusiastic support of insurers and employer organizations for a wide variety of
Medicaid initiatives over the years to improve coverage for women and children.
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requirements to a defined set of benefits known as “medical assistance.”48 The
law also affords participating states the right to federal contributions toward
the cost of both the medical assistance and program administration.49 In FY
year 1997, the latest year for which final data are available, total federal and
state Medicaid spending stood at $161.2 billion.50
Medicaid is voluntary for states which, as a condition of participation,
must agree to administer their programs in accordance with a series of federal
requirements set forth in both the statute and regulations.51 Participating states
must administer their programs through a “single state agency” which may be
any agency (for example a unit of the state welfare or public health agency).52
Regardless of which part of state government serves as the single state agency,
federal law requires that eligibility for Medicaid be determined by the state
welfare agency.53 Federal law also requires states to supplement this basic
eligibility determination function with outstationed enrollment activities for
certain populations in order to improve case-finding and applicants with the
enrollment process.54 Federal Medicaid administrative payments are available
to support the cost of the enrollment process, including outstationing.55
All discussions of Medicaid begin with the question: who is eligible?
Medicaid eligibility requirements are notoriously complex. Eligibility for

48. Social Security Act § 1905(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1994).
49. Social Security Act § 1903(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
50. Data from the Health Care Financing Administration; calculations by the Urban Institute
for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. See infra Figure 10.
51. Social Security Act § 1902 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a, et. seq. Federal regulations are
codified as part of Chapter 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The Health Care Financing
Administration also issues extensive informal program guidance, which can be found at its
website, Health Care Financing Administration, http://www.hcfa.gov.
52. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1994). State Medicaid plans
identify a range of state agencies as the Medicaid agency. Katie Tedrow, Organizing Medicaid
Responsibilities: A Look at Current State Agency Structure, 12 AM. PUB. HUM. SERVS. ASS’N.
WASH. MEMO 21 (2000).
53. Social Security Act §1902(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. 1936a(a)(5) (1994). In the case of applicants
for the federally administered Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, which is
administered by the Social Security Administration, states may enter into agreements with SSA
under which the federal government determines Medicaid eligibility as part of the SSI application
process. Id.
54. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(55), 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(5) (1994).
55. Outstationed enrollment is mandatory for children and pregnant women and must be
provided at federally qualified health centers and disproportionate share hospitals. At their
option, states may conduct outstationing and outreach activities in any location. Outstationing is
relatively common in the case of children, in the wake of the enactment of the State Children’s
Health Insurance Program of 1997 (SCHIP) which operates as a companion program to the basic
Medicaid structure and which serves as a catalyst for the identification of eligible children. See
LYNDA FLOWERS & TRISH RILEY, NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, AN
ANALYSIS OF POLICY ISSUES IN SCHIP AND MEDICAID IMPLEMENTATION 3 (2000).
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federally assisted Medicaid benefits56 depends on an individual’s ability to
satisfy several basic eligibility criteria, the principal ones are categorical
eligibility, financial eligibility, state residency and citizenship/legal residency
requirements.57 We focus here on categorical and financial eligibility,
although failure to satisfy residency or legal status requirements58 will be
equally disqualifying.
Medicaid requires that in order to be eligible for federally assisted
coverage, an applicant must fall into one of the federally recognized eligibility
categories. As of 1993, the federal statute contained over fifty separate
coverage categories,59 and more have been added since then.60 Medicaid’s
principal mandatory coverage categories, that is, the categories of beneficiaries
whom all state plans must cover as a condition of participation are pregnant
women, children born after September 30, 1983 and under age nineteen,
individuals who meet states’ July, 1996 eligibility criteria for Aid to Families
with Dependent Children,61 certain qualified severely impaired individuals and
recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI).62 In addition, states must

56. States may of course extend Medicaid to any individual regardless of whether federal
eligibility criteria are met if they are willing to bear financial responsibility for total program
costs. With limited exceptions states restrict coverage to individuals and services for whom
federal financial participation is available.
57. An individual must be a resident of the state in which he applies for benefits. Special
residency rules have been developed to determine residency in the case of persons
institutionalized outside of the state, children living in out-of-state foster care and adoption
arrangements, and migrant agricultural workers. 42 C.F.R. § 403 (1994). The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 established a legal presumption
against coverage of individuals who are legal residents but not citizens, although the law contains
numerous exceptions. SARA ROSENBAUM, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY AND CITIZENSHIP STATUS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR
IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS 1 (2000) [hereinafter IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS], available at
http://www.kff.org.
58. For a complete discussion of Medicaid and legal status requirements, see generally id.
59. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 3.
60. Coverage categories added in recent years include vaccine eligible children, Social
Security Act § 1927, 42 U.S.C. § 1396s (1994); optional targeted low income children, Social
Security Act, § 1902(a)(10)(a)(ii)(VII), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(a)(ii)(VII) (1994); employed
individuals with medically improved disabilities, Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVI),
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(II)(XIII) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); and independent foster care
adolescents, Social Security Act, § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVII); 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVII) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
61. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(1996). For a discussion of the welfare reform and its implications for Medicaid eligibility, see
generally The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44.
62. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i)(II), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(II) (1994).
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furnish cost-sharing assistance to certain low income Medicare beneficiaries.63
Optional coverage categories include numerous additional categories of
families, and elderly and disabled persons,64 and medically needy
individuals.65 Medically needy persons are individuals who fall into one of the
federally recognized coverage categories, but whose incomes and resources
exceed “categorically needy” eligibility levels. As a result, they spend down to
eligibility by personally incurring medical care costs, a process that can be
thought of as a deductible.66 Figure 2 sets forth Medicaid’s principal
categorical “eligibility pathways.”
Medicaid also requires that applicants satisfy the program’s financial
eligibility rules. All participating states must adopt certain mandatory
minimum financial eligibility guidelines, but with the notable exception of
children, pregnant women, and certain workers with disabilities, these
standards are notoriously strict. An applicant’s financial eligibility depends on
both income and assets, although states have the authority to waive or
liberalize asset tests in the case of certain applicants and recipients who do not
receive cash assistance.67 Federal law also contains complex standards for
calculating family income, which vary by coverage group.68 As Figure 2
illustrates, the minimum income eligibility standards vary by group and range
from slightly above the federal poverty level in the case of pregnant women,
infants and young children69 to state-set standards that average well below the
federal poverty level in the case of most non-disabled, non-elderly adults.70

63. Low income Medicare beneficiaries whose incomes exceed Medicaid eligibility levels
qualify for cost-sharing assistance for Medicare premiums, deductibles and coinsurance. Social
Security Act §1905d(p), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (1994).
64. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I)-(XII), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I)(XII) (1994).
65. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(C).
66. These individuals effectively “spend down” to Medicaid coverage by spending their
“excess” income and resources on medical care. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 12.
The program primarily is a means for financing high cost long-term institutional care such as
nursing home care. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.300-350 (1999).
67. Social Security Act §§ 1902(r)(2), 1931.
68. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(17), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1994); 42 C.F.R. §
435.600-640 (1999).
69. In 2000, the federal poverty level for a family of three was $14,150 in the forty-eight
contiguous states and the District of Columbia. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE 2000
HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES 1 (2000), available at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/00
poverty.htm.
70. The standard for non-disabled, non-elderly adults must be tied to the most closely
associated “welfare category” which, in this case, would be the AFDC program. Social Security
Act, § 1902(a)(17), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). Furthermore, federal law generally limits the
maximum income standard for beneficiaries to 133% of the AFDC payment level for a family of
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The effect of these standards on eligibility is so enormous that in 1999 a
mother working full-time at the minimum wage would not be able to qualify
for coverage for herself, although she could secure it for her children.71

Figure 2

Medicaid Income Eligibility Standards, 1999
Percent of Federal Poverty Level

200%

185%

133%

Federal
Mandate

133%
100%

100%

State
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100%

National AFDC
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Preschool School-age Teenage
1 to 5
6 to 15
16 to 18

41%

SSI/
Disabled

Phase-in by
2002

Adults
with
Children

*AFDC average for 1996 is the standard used for Section 1931 eligibility.
Note: Some states have increased eligibility through Sec. 1115 or Sec. 1902(r)(2) or SCHIP.
Federal Poverty Level is $13,800 for a family of three for 1999.
SOURCE: National Governors’ Association, 1999 and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
1999 analyses, compiled by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.

States have significant latitude to establish financial eligibility conditions
for all categorical groups. In the case of children, pregnant women, and
families with children, persons with disabilities, and the elderly, states may
liberalize the standards and methodologies beyond those that are used to
determine eligibility for cash assistance.72 As a result, a state could, for
example, extend coverage to all families with children where family incomes
are at or below twice the federal poverty level, regardless of work status.73
Individuals who meet program eligibility requirements are entitled under
federal law to a defined set of benefits.74 Federal law lists numerous benefit

that size with no other income. Social Security Act § 1903(f)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(f). There
are numerous exceptions to this rule, however.
71. The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44, at 1470.
72. Social Security Act §§ 1902(r)(2) & 1931.
73. The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44, at 1470. The District of Columbia,
for example, covers all resident families with children with family incomes at or below 200% of
the federal poverty level.
74. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1994). As noted
previously, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Suter v. Artist M, 503 U.S. 347 (1992), the
question of whether Medicaid creates legally enforceable entitlement rights has become
somewhat unsettled. Courts have tended to take a case-by-case approach to the issue, ruling on
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groupings, some of which participating states are required to furnish to
“categorically needy” beneficiaries75 (i.e., beneficiaries who do not qualify for
Medicaid as medically needy persons). Other benefits are optional in the care
of adults.76 Required benefits consist of inpatient hospital care, outpatient
hospital care, nursing facility care, physician services, laboratory and x-ray
services, services of federally qualified health centers and rural health clinics,
family planning services and supplies for individuals of childbearing age
(including sexually active minors), early and periodic screening diagnostic and
treatment (EPSDT) services for individuals under age twenty-one, and nurse
midwife and nurse practitioner services.77 Optional benefits are extensive and
range from basic preventive services to advanced long-term care benefits.78
Most states cover most classes of benefits, although with limitations.79
Regardless of whether benefits are covered under a state plan on a
mandatory or optional basis, federal law sets minimum standards for
determining the reasonableness of coverage.80 Although states have discretion
to set limits on coverage, coverage limits must be reasonable;81 in the case of
required services, states may not discriminate on the basis of diagnosis or

the enforceability of the statute in light of the specific provisions of law that plaintiffs seek to
enforce. See supra text accompanying note 45. Thus, for example, beneficiaries with disabilities
are generally accorded a legal right to enforce the requirement that services be furnished with
“reasonable promptness.” See Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998); Cramer v. Chiles, 33
F. Supp. 2d 1342 (D. Fla. 1999); Lewis v. New Mexico Dep’t. of Health, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D.
N.M. 2000); Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123 (9th Cir. 1994); Rodriguez v. City of New
York, 197 F.3d 611 (2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, children are considered to have an enforceable
right to early and periodic screening diagnostic and treatment benefits (EPSDT). See Frew v.
Gilbert, No. 3:93CA65, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12410 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2000), Salazar v.
District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278 (D. D.C. 1996); Pittman v. Florida Dep’t of Health and
Rehab. Serv., 998 F.2d 887 (11th Cir. 1993); Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315 (7th Cir. 1993);
Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
75. Social Security Act § 1902 (a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1994).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Social Security Act § 1905(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1994). The most prominent
optional benefit is prescribed drugs.
79. In the case of children entitled to EPSDT services, all service limitations that otherwise
would be permissible for adults are prohibited, both with respect to classes of benefits and the
amount, duration and scope of coverage that is required. Social Security Act § 1905(r)(5), 42
U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (1994).
80. Chiles, 136 F.3d at 715.
81. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(a) (2000). The reasonableness test is measured against the total
beneficiary population rather than subclasses of beneficiaries. Thus, for example, where a state
uses a 3-physician-visit limit per month and permits additional visits with prior authorization, the
limitation is sufficient to satisfy the needs of more than 95% of all beneficiaries and is considered
reasonable. Curtis v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980).
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condition.82 States may use appropriate coverage criteria based on medical
necessity.83
In the case of children under age twenty-one, Medicaid coverage is the
broadest of any public or private health coverage arrangement in the U.S.
States must, in the case of children and as part of the EPSDT program, cover
all federally recognized categories of benefits and services that are determined
to be medically necessary, regardless of whether in the case of the overtwenty-one population otherwise applicable across-the-board limitations would
be considered reasonable.84 In addition, EPSDT covers a broad range of
preventive health services.85
The breadth of Medicaid’s benefit entitlement extends beyond amount,
duration and scope considerations. The program also prohibits virtually all
patient cost sharing, including premiums, deductibles and coinsurance.86 Thus,
with the exception of the medically needy, who as noted “spend down” to
financial eligibility,87 recipients may be charged only nominal amounts for
coverage and services.88
While federal requirements are stringent in the case of coverage, they
afford states considerable latitude in the areas of provider qualification,
participation and compensation. States also have broad discretion with respect
to service delivery.89 Only qualified providers are permitted to participate in
Medicaid;90 however, with certain exceptions,91 states have significant
flexibility to set provider participation standards.92 In the case of certain
groups of providers, including federally qualified health centers, rural health
clinics, hospice programs and disproportionate share hospitals, the statute
82. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b), (c) (1999).
83. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (1999).
84. Social Security Act § 1905(r)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (1994). Pittman, 998 F.2d at
892; Miller, 10 F.3d at 1320; Hunter, 944 F. Supp. at 920.
85. Social Security Act § 1905(r). Preventive services include periodic assessments of
growth and development, all age appropriate immunizations recommended by the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP) and complete vision, dental and hearing care.
86. Social Security Act §§ 1902(a)(14), 1916, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(14), 1396o (1994 &
Supp. III 1997). Cost-sharing is prohibited in the case of children under eighteen, pregnant
women and nursing facility residents. States do have the option to impose more substantial cost
sharing on certain groups of individuals, including former persons with disabilities who qualify
for Medicaid on the basis of their work status but whose income is moderate. The premiums
must be income related. SCHNEIDER & ELLBERGER, supra note 9.
87. 42 C.F.R. § 435.800-843 (1999).
88. See Social Security Act § 1902(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
89. Id.
90. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(23), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
91. States must cover the services of federally qualified health centers, rural health clinics,
nurse midwives, and nurse practitioners. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(2)(C), (17), (21), 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(2)(C), (a)(17), (a)(21) (1994).
92. Id.
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contains certain required payment methodologies.93 With respect to health
centers, which as a matter of law serve large numbers of uninsured patients,94
federal law prohibits Medicaid programs from demanding deep compensation
discounts and requires agencies to pay health centers the reasonable cost of
care; this policy is designed to assure that cost-shifting onto grant funds
designed to care for the uninsured does not result.95 Similarly, states must
maintain a formula to define and furnish supplemental payments to hospitals
that serve a disproportionate number of low income and Medicaid insured
patients.96 In the case of other providers, states have broad discretion to set
payment rates.97 However, in setting rates for hospitals and nursing facilities,
states must adhere to certain procedural notice and comment requirements.98
Furthermore, payments must be consistent with “efficiency, economy and
quality of care and . . . sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and
services are available under the plan at least to the extent that care and services
are available to the general population in the geographic service area.”99
In addition to establishing provider qualification standards, Medicaid
agencies have the option to use various forms of managed care arrangements to
provide covered services to program enrollees.100 Under federal law, state
agencies can condition coverage for most groups of beneficiaries on mandatory
enrollment in some form of managed care arrangement101 and may contract
with either comprehensive managed care organizations or with primary care

93. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(13), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
94. The Public Health Service Act § 330, 42 U.S.C. § 254c (Supp. III 1997), authorizes the
establishment and operation of federally funded health centers. As a condition of funding, health
centers must offer certain services, serve populations and communities designated as medically
underserved, and prospectively adjust their charges in accordance with a fee schedule that reflects
family income.
95. Id. A similar cost-related payment policy applies to the Medicare program. Social
Security Act § 1832(a)(2)(D), 1833(a)(3) (1999).
96. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(13)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
97. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(30)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (1994).
98. Id. These procedural requirements take the place of the Boren Amendment, which
required states to pay hospitals and nursing homes in accordance with cost-related principles and
which was repealed by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-33, § 4711, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
99. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(30)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (1994).
100. For a comprehensive review of state managed care purchasing practices see NEVA KAYE
& CYNTHIA PERNICE, NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, MEDICAID MANAGED
CARE: A GUIDE FOR STATES (4th ed. 1999), available at http://www.nashp.org/pubs/
medicaid.htm; SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF
PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES, NEGOTIATING THE NEW HEALTH SYSTEM: A
NATIONWIDE STUDY OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1999).
101. Social Security Act § 1932(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. 1396n(a)(1)(A) (1994).
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case managers, who offer a more limited form of managed care.102 As of 1998,
more than half of all beneficiaries were enrolled in some form of managed care
arrangement103 and thirty-eight states made at least some use of managed care
for persons with disabilities.104
Medicaid’s status as a legal entitlement has resulted in countless lawsuits
by beneficiaries who have challenged both individual and across-the-board
denials and reductions in eligibility and services, as well as violations of
procedural due process safeguards. In addition, providers, who are entitled to
payment for the covered care and services they furnish to enrollees, have
mounted extensive litigation against state agencies over both the issue of
payment, as well as the level of payment.105 In addition, providers have
successfully challenged on due process grounds their exclusion from the
Medicaid program without prior notice and hearing.106 This extensive
litigation has continued into the present time, with legal challenges to virtually
all aspects of state administration, ranging from the adequacy of enrollment

102. Id.
103. Data from the Health Care Financing Administration; calculations by the Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, at http://www.kff.org.
104. MARSHA REGENSTEIN & CHRISTY SCHROER, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND
THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: STATE
PROFILES 5 (1998).
105. Provider litigation against Medicaid agencies over payment rates culminated with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (holding that
under Medicaid’s “Boren Amendment,” hospitals had an enforceable legal right to payment levels
that reflected the cost of care incurred by efficient and economically operated institutions). The
Boren Amendment, which was repealed in 1997 by the Balanced Budget Act, covered both
hospitals and nursing facilities and was long criticized by states as a source of mandatory and
excessive program expenditures. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4712(c),
111 Stat. 509 (1997). The language that replaced the Boren Amendment requires states to
establish and adhere to a public process for determination of rates, but with the exception of
payments to disproportionate share hospitals, removes any rate standard. In addition to the Boren
Amendment, the statute requires that state Medicaid payments be sufficient to ensure that care is
accessible. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(30), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (1994). The adequacy
of payment provisions of the law have resulted in separate and extensive litigation. See, e.g.,
Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (challenging the sufficiency of dental
payments).
106. In MedCare HMO v. Bradley, a virtually non-functional HMO successfully obtained a
ruling enjoining the state from removing its Medicaid members and assigning them to other
functional plans on the ground that it was being deprived of property without due process. 788 F.
Supp. 1460 (N.D. Ill. 1992). The MedCare ruling, which considered the interests of the HMO,
without concern for the beneficiaries, was codified into the Medicaid statute as part of the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Social Security Act § 1932(f)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(f)(4)
(Supp. IV 1998), prohibits the termination of managed care entity contracts without prior notice
and hearing. States may, at their discretion, notify enrollees that termination hearings are under
way and permit members to switch plans. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

MEDICAID AT THIRTY-FIVE

25

protections and benefit levels to the operation of managed care and long-term
care systems, as well as other aspects of the modern Medicaid program.107
Given the legal exposure that state Medicaid programs incur, the obvious
question is “what is in it for a state?” The answer lies in the states’ legally
enforceable entitlement to federal financial assistance on an open-ended basis
for the medical assistance and administrative service costs they incur.108
Indeed, while the nominal level of states’ entitlement is considerable (at a
minimum Medicaid reimburses states for half of all federally recognized costs
and in the case of poorer states and certain administrative services, the level of
federal contribution is considerably higher), over the years states have done a
remarkable job at manipulating the federal Medicaid contribution formula to
create actual federal contribution levels far higher than the level to which they
might therefore be entitled under the nominal statutory formula.109 Therefore,
while legal exposure may create a disincentive for state Medicaid programs, it
is offset by the extensive reimbursement for medical assistance they receive.
B.

Trends in Coverage and Expenditures

While it is possible to gain a technical understanding of Medicaid through
a legal overview, for broad policy analysis purposes examination of Medicaid
recipient and expenditure data is essential to understanding program trends and
identifying major and emerging policy issues. Therefore, this section of the
article examines Medicaid statistics. Unless otherwise noted, all of the data
presented has been prepared for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the
Uninsured110 and employs a variety of governmental data sources. Data on
Medicaid coverage and expenditures are from 1997, the latest year for which
final statistics on coverage and expenditures were available as of the summer
of 2000.

107. A complete review of all Medicaid litigation would be so vast that it lies well beyond the
scope of this article. Individuals interested in gaining a clearer sense of the level of litigation that
has transpired need only examine the United States Code Annotated. Readers may wish to visit
the website of the National Health Law Program, at http://www.healthlaw.org, which specializes
among other matters in Medicaid legal advocacy.
108. Social Security Act § 1903(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1994).
109. For a particularly clever state federal contribution strategy that has resulted in the
payment of billions of dollars in federal Medicaid funding beyond the amount nominally
specified under the statutory formula, see Letter from Timothy M. Westmoreland, Director,
Center for Medicaid and State Operations, to State Medicaid Director 1 (July 26, 2000)
(regarding states “upper payment limit” activities) at http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/
smd72600.htm. Proposed rules to stop this practice were promulgated in October 2000. 65 Fed.
Reg. 60,151 (Oct. 10, 2000).
110. See generally THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, at
http://www.kff.org.
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As noted previously, Medicaid law contains more than fifty separate
eligibility groups.111 Nonetheless, for health services research and policy
analysis purposes, these groupings can be collapsed into four “macro”
categories: children; non-disabled, non-elderly adults; persons with disabilities;
and the elderly. Within these four groupings, a further broad distinction can be
made between those who receive both Medicaid and cash welfare assistance,
and those who do not receive cash assistance. This collapsing of eligibility
groupings creates certain anomalies (for example, disabled children are
grouped within the disabled persons category rather than within the children’s
category). However, experts do not consider these peculiarities to adversely
affect the accuracy of broad policy analysis.
Medicaid data tell policy makers much about the program. First and
foremost, children dominate Medicaid;112 in 1997, children accounted for fiftytwo percent of all beneficiaries.113 Non-disabled, non-elderly adults accounted
for twenty-one percent of program beneficiaries,114 while disabled, non-elderly
persons accounted for seventeen percent of enrollees.115 The elderly
comprised ten percent of all program beneficiaries.116 The predominance of
children in the program is a testament to childhood poverty in America; in
1996 nearly twenty percent of all American children were poor.117
While children comprise the majority of beneficiaries, Figure 3 shows that
between 1990 and 1997, the number of Medicaid-enrolled children actually
declined slightly, as did the number of non-disabled, non-elderly adults.118
Figure 4 shows that between 1995 and 1997, enrollment for children and adults
dropped by 1.4% and 5.4% respectively after growing significantly during the
first part of the decade.119 The number of elderly enrollees grew and then
stabilized, while the number of persons with disabilities showed growth
throughout this time period.120

111. See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 3.
112. See infra Figure 8.
113. Id.
114. Id. Because poor adults are not recognized as an independent eligibility category under
federal law, one can presume that these adults are overwhelmingly pregnant women or caretakers
of children.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. In 1996 the figure stood at 19.8%. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, KIDS COUNT DATA
BOOK 22 (1998).
118. See infra Figure 3.
119. See infra Figure 4.
120. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

MEDICAID AT THIRTY-FIVE

27

Figure 3

Medicaid Enrollment Growth by
Eligibility Group, 1990-1997
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SOURCE: Urban Institute estimates based on HCFA-2082 and HCFA-64 Reports, prepared
for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.

Figure 4

Rate of Growth in Medicaid Enrollment
by Eligibility Group, 1990-1997
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SOURCE: Urban Institute estimates based on HCFA-2082 and HCFA-64 Reports, prepared
for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.

The seeds of decline in Medicaid coverage of children and non-disabled
adults probably began as a result of federally supported welfare reform
experiments begun by the Clinton Administration in 1993, which introduced
time limits and enhanced work requirements into the AFDC program.121 With
121. See Figure 4.
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the enactment of federal welfare reform legislation in 1996, this decline may
have actually increased, since the new legislation permitted far more
aggressive efforts to terminate welfare and prevent enrollment than those
sanctioned by the Administration as part of its earlier demonstrations.122 As
women and children were removed from welfare rolls, state welfare agencies
(which as noted administer the eligibility component of Medicaid as a matter
of federal law) failed to draw a distinction between welfare eligibility (which
ended) and Medicaid eligibility (which continued).123
The growth in the number of persons with disabilities in the early part of
the decade can be attributed to an expansion of coverage for disabled
children,124 as well as more aggressive efforts on the part of states to design
home and community service programs for persons with disabilities.125 The
continued growth in the latter part of the decade probably is a result of a
continuation of these factors, as well as greater awareness of the availability of
Medicaid for persons with disabilities.
Depending on the regulation sub-group, the importance of Medicaid varies
significantly by population sub-category. In 1997, forty-four percent of all
poor persons (i.e., individuals with family incomes below the federal poverty
level) were enrolled in Medicaid; among the near poor the number dropped to
sixteen percent.126 Medicaid is of profound importance to American
pediatrics.
As noted, children comprise the largest single group of
beneficiaries;127 furthermore, in 1997 more than twenty percent of all
American children received Medicaid.128 The program is twice as important for
women as men (nine percent of all women received Medicaid in 1997
compared with five percent of men).129 This greater level of enrollment is

122. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 701-42,
801-16, 110 Stat. 2287-2318 (1996).
123. The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44.
124. This expansion undoubtedly came to a halt with the enactment of the 1996 welfare
reform legislation, which, among other provisions, sharply curtailed coverage for children with
mental and developmental disabilities. The Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan v. Zebley,
which overturned the standards and procedures used by the federal government to determine
children’s eligibility for SSI, resulted in an overhaul of eligibility criteria that had its greatest
impact on children with mental and developmental conditions. 493 U.S. 521 (1990). In 1996,
federal legislation expressly reversed Zebley. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, tit. I, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
125. As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C., this expansion may
continue as states attempt to remove institutional bias from their state health programs through
restructured Medicaid programs that emphasize the eligibility of persons with disabilities for
services in the community. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
126. The 1997 poverty level for a family of three was $13,300.
127. See supra Figure 3.
128. Id.
129. See infra Figure 16.
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undoubtedly a result of women’s higher poverty rates, the existence of femalespecific eligibility categories (i.e., pregnancy), and the fact that women are
more likely to show up as caretaker relatives of children in poor households.130
Minority Americans are also disproportionately likely to be enrolled in
Medicaid.131 In 1997, twenty-two percent of all African Americans, and
nineteen percent of all Hispanic and Native Americans were enrolled in
Medicaid, compared with eight percent of white Americans.132 Studies suggest
that adults with activity limitations are nearly seven times as likely as those
without limitations to be enrolled in Medicaid.133 Finally, while fourteen
percent of all Medicare beneficiaries receive Medicaid,134 when disabled
beneficiaries are considered separately, this figure skyrockets to thirty-six
percent.135
As noted, states have considerable power over Medicaid eligibility levels.
The state role in establishing Medicaid eligibility is underscored by data on
state-level variation in eligibility. Figure 5 shows that during the 1996-1998
time period, twelve states maintained sufficiently restrictive eligibility
standards to maintain coverage at under eight percent of their state populations,
while fourteen states covered more than 12.5% of their populations.136
Figure 5

Percent of Nonelderly Population Covered
by Medicaid, by State, 1996-1998

* Includes the District of Colum bia.
SOURCE: Urban Institute estimates based on pooled March 1997, 1998,
and 1999 Current Population Surveys, prepared for the Kaiser
Commission on M edicaid and the Uninsured.

<8.0% (13 states)
8.0% to 9.5% (8 states)
9.6% to 12.5% (16 states)
>12.5% (14 states*)

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Dennis McCarty & Helen Levine, Needs of People with Chronic and Disabling
Conditions, in ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: PROMISES AND PROSPECTS FOR LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS 61, 66 (Marsha Lillie-Blanton et al. eds., 1999).
134. See The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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The impact of the 1996 welfare reform legislation can be seen in the
declining proportion of Medicaid enrollees who receive cash assistance.137
Figure 6 shows that the proportion of Medicaid enrollees who also receive cash
assistance fell from sixty-seven percent in 1990 to fifty percent in 1997.138
These declines occur even among individuals who, following the loss of cash
assistance, remain eligible for Medicaid.139 Figure 7 shows the impact of the
loss of welfare on Medicaid enrollment.140 Within a year of leaving cash
assistance, only fifty percent of children retain Medicaid (even though virtually
all remain entitled to coverage as low income children), while Medicaid
enrollment drops to thirty-six percent in the case of women despite their
eligibility for transitional benefits.141 Figure 7 also underscores that former
welfare recipients do not substitute private insurance for Medicaid.142 Only
twenty-seven percent of children and only twenty-three percent of women
were privately insured at the end of the time period in question.143

Figure 6

Medicaid Enrollees Receiving Cash
Assistance, by Eligibility Group, 1990-1997
80%

Percent of Enrollees Receiving Cash Assistance*
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0%
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* “Cash Assistance” refers to enrollees who receive AFDC/TANF or SSI payments.
SOURCE: Urban Institute estimates based on HCFA-2082 and HCFA-64 Reports, prepared
for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Figure 6.
Id.
The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44.
See infra Figure 7.
The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44.
See infra Figure 7.
Id.
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Figure 7

Health Insurance Coverage for Women and
Children after Leaving Cash Assistance
Medicaid

Private

Other Public

Uninsured

50%
41%
36%
27%

25%

23%

2%

4%

Children

Women

Note: Health insurance coverage is documented one year after leaving cash assistance.
Note: The data includes overlap between categories: 2.5% of women have private coverage and
Medicaid, 1.7% of women have Medicaid and other public, 4.3% of children have private coverage and
Medicaid, 0.54% of children have Medicaid and other public
SOURCE: Urban Institute Analyses of the National Survey of America’s Families, preliminary data,
1999, prepared for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.

In sum, data on Medicaid enrollment shows a high dependence on the
program among the poor, persons with disabilities, members of racial and
ethnic minority groups, and children and women of childbearing age,144 who
otherwise would be without access to health insurance.145 Women and
children appear to be experiencing a decline in enrollment owing to the advent
of welfare reform and states’ failure to implement aggressive outreach and
case-finding efforts or formal procedures for ensuring the retention of
Medicaid coverage during the welfare disenrollment process.146 While the
Health Care Financing Administration has taken action to require states to put
safeguards into place, these efforts occurred only years after large-scale
disenrollment had begun147 and prospects for finding and re-enrolling the
thousands of women and children who incorrectly lost benefits are limited at
best.148
The enrollment data underscore Medicaid’s significant and growing role
for persons with disabilities, among whom enrollment has shown steady
increases throughout the decade.149 Underlying factors include greater levels
of state investment in the provision of home and community services for

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See supra Figures 2, 3 and 7.
Id.
See supra Figures 2, 3, 4 and 7.
Westmoreland, supra note 109.
Id.
See supra Figure 3.
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persons with serious disabilities, as well as changes in eligibility criteria that
have resulted in enhanced coverage levels.150
1.

Expenditures by population sub-group

Spending by population sub-group is an important means for gauging the
relative and absolute importance of the program where different subpopulations are concerned. Figure 8 shows the difference between enrollment
and expenditures. In 1997, although non-disabled adults and children
comprised nearly seventy-five percent of program beneficiaries, they
accounted for only twenty-five percent of program spending.151 Sixty-five
percent of all program expenditures were made for elderly and disabled
individuals who together accounted for only slightly more than one quarter of
all enrollees.152 Figure 9 presents an alternative means of looking at
expenditures. This figure shows that in 1997, only one quarter of all Medicaid
expenditures could be attributed to “acute care” services (i.e., services other
than long-term care) for families.153 Thus, of the $161 billion in Medicaid
spending that year, only one quarter is in fact associated with the types of
expenditures that one might find under a standard commercial insurance plan
for working age adults and their children.154 The vast majority of program
spending was made on behalf of populations who overwhelmingly exist
outside of the conventional insurance market and where needs would in
significant measure be considered uninsurable.155
Figure 8

Medicaid Enrollees and Expenditures
by Enrollment Group, 1997
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10.1%

DSH
Payments**
9.9%
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Children
51.8%

Adults
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Children
15.1%

Enrollees
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Total = 40.6 million people

Total = $161.2 billion

*Total expenditures exclude administrative expenses.
**Disproportionate Share Hospital payments.
Source: Urban Institute estimates based on HCFA-2082 and HCFA-64 Reports,
prepared for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured

150. See, e.g., Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a)(10)(A)(ii) (1994
& Supp. III 1997).
151. See Figure 8.
152. Id.
153. See infra Figure 9.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Figure 9

Acute Care Spending for the Non-Elderly and
Non-Disabled Population as a Percent of Total
Medicaid Spending, 1997
Acute Care Spending for
Children and Adults
$38 Billion
(24%)

Total = $161 Billion
Note: Expenditures do not include adjustments or administrative costs.
SOURCE: Urban Institute estimates based on HCFA-2082 and HCFA-64 Reports,
prepared for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.

Figure 10 shows the growth in expenditure by population group between
1990 and 1997. While spending on children and non-disabled adults grew
slightly over this time period, spending on persons with disabilities increased
dramatically.156 These figures are consistent with those related to enrollment
growth and show Medicaid’s growing importance for this population.
Figure 10

Medicaid Spending Growth by
Eligibility Group, 1990-1997
Dollars (in billions)
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Note: T otal expenditures exclude administrative expenses.
SOURCE: Urban Institute estimates based on HCFA-2082 and HCFA-64 Reports, prepared
for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.

156. See Figure 10.
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The significance of Medicaid expenditure figures for persons with
disabilities is further heightened by statistics that disaggregate these
expenditures into their acute and long-term components for each population
sub-group, as illustrated by Figure 11.157 The pattern that emerges for
beneficiaries with disabilities is extremely important to understand. When
acute and long-term spending are separated, it becomes evident that, perhaps
contrary to popular expectations, the majority of the more than $8,000 in
annual expenditures for this population in 1997 were for acute care services
(e.g., outpatient care, community services, prescribed drugs), rather than
institutional long-term care.158 It is also possible to see the very high average
annual cost of acute care spending for persons with disabilities, with
expenditures levels that vastly exceed those that would be anticipated under a
standard commercial policy.
Figure 11

Medicaid Expenditures Per Enrollee
by Acute and Long-Term Care, 1997
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MCOs, and payments to Medicare.

Note: Expenditures do not include DSH, adjustments, or administrative costs.
SOURCE: Urban Institute estimates based on HCFA-2082 and HCFA-64 Reports, prepared
for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.

This high level of acute care spending on persons with disabilities
underscores the shift in care and services away from institutional settings and
toward community services. It also is a strong indicator of just how far beyond
the conventional insurance market beneficiaries with disabilities lie. This
figure suggests the limited potential for applying “market” strategies to
improve coverage of persons with disabilities.159

157. See Figure 11.
158. Were it not for the fact that Medicare is the first payer for dually eligible beneficiaries,
this same pattern also undoubtedly would have been in evidence for the elderly.
159. In theory, applying risk adjustment principles to insurance premiums (i.e., paying more
for certain enrollees based on health status) might be a means of better matching premium
revenues to health care spending expectations. However, the current science of risk adjustment
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Expenditures by service type

In addition to considering Medicaid’s relative importance for specific
population sub-groups, policy analysts also examine expenditures for different
classes of services. Figure 12 shows Medicaid expenditures by service type.
In 1997, more than one third of all program spending entailed the purchase of
long-term care services (i.e., home health care, mental health services, the
services of intermediate care facilities for persons with mental retardation and
related conditions, and nursing facility services).160 Figure 13 illustrates
Medicaid’s extraordinary role in the case of long-term care. In 1997, Medicaid
accounted for thirty-eight percent of all long-term care expenditures among all
payers and forty-seven percent of all expenditures for nursing home care.161
The long-term care system is effectively dependent on Medicaid (and to a
lesser extent Medicare).162
Figure 12

Medicaid Expenditures by Service, 1997
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SOURCE: Urban Institute Estimates based on HCFA-2082 and HCFA-64 Reports,
prepared for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.

appears to be sufficiently under-developed at this point in time to prevent this approach from
being feasible.
160. See Figure 12.
161. See infra Figure 13.
162. Id.
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Figure 13

Long-Term Care Financing, 1997
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Finally, Medicaid’s major role in the support of the safety net can be seen
in Figure 14, which compares Medicaid patients as a percentage of total
patients for primary physician practices and practices of federally supported
community health centers, which furnish comprehensive primary health
services to low income and medically underserved communities.163 Figure 14
shows that in a standard physician practice, Medicaid comprises nine percent
of all patients served.164 In the case of health centers, Medicaid patients
account for thirty-four percent of all patients.165 Revenue numbers are
consistent with patient load: in 1997, Medicaid accounted for more than one
third of all health center revenues.166

163.
164.
165.
166.

See infra Figure 14.
Id.
Id.
SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
HEALTH CENTERS’ ROLE AS SAFETY NET PROVIDERS FOR MEDICAID PATIENTS AND THE
UNINSURED 13 (2000), available at http://www.kff.org.
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Figure 14

Health Center and Physician Office
Patients by Payer Source
8%

14%

14%

40%

34%

Health Centers

63%

Medicare
Commercial
Self-pay
Medicaid

10%
9%
Physician Offices

SOURCE: 1995 National Ambulatory Care Survey; Center for Health Service Research and Policy analysis of 1997 UDS.

In sum, Medicaid program expenditure data demonstrate the extraordinary
level of dependence among various sub-population groups on the program in
both absolute and relative dollar levels. Medicaid spending on elderly persons
and persons with disabilities is extremely high on a per capita basis. These
high spending levels, particularly in the case of persons with disabilities,
reflect high levels of expenditures not only for long-term care services but for
acute care services as well, in amounts that extend well beyond those levels
that would be anticipated under conventional insurance. Expenditures on
working age adults and children are low and account for a minority of total
program spending, yet as the enrollment data suggest, these populations are
extremely reliant on the program to meet their insurance needs.167
The expenditure data also underscore the central role that Medicaid plays
in the nation’s long-term care system, accounting for the largest single share of
overall national spending.168 In the absence of any other third party financing
mechanism, Medicaid has filled the financial void where both institutional and
community-based long-term care services are concerned. Were Medicaid to
disappear, not only would millions of individuals be left without coverage but
the long-term care system in the United States would virtually collapse.
Similarly, in light of Medicaid’s role as an underwriter of safety net
providers (i.e., health care providers that treat high volumes of both uninsured
and Medicaid-sponsored patients such as public hospitals, health centers, and
167. See supra Figure 8.
168. See supra Figure 13.
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public health agencies), the loss of Medicaid funds could be expected to
significantly adversely affect the ability of the safety net to absorb growing
numbers of uninsured patients. As Figure 15 shows, between 1990 and 1997,
when the number of uninsured Americans grew by twenty-three percent, the
number of uninsured patients served by health centers grew by fifty percent.169
Much of this capacity within health centers to absorb so many uninsured
patients can be attributed to a significant increase in overall revenues, fueled
by broader Medicaid coverage and better Medicaid rates paid to health centers
over the decade.170
Figure 15

Growth in Uninsured Population
Served by Health Centers, 1990-1998
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SOURCE: Center for Health Services Research and Policy analysis of the 1997 and 1998 Uniform Data System; EBRI, 1998.

IV. MODERNIZING MEDICAID: MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR
REFORM
Despite Medicaid’s enormous role in the modern health system, the
program suffers from a series of major problems tied to its basic federal design
compounded by federal and state administrative choices over the years. Over
the course of three and a half decades, legislative changes have been heaped on
changes (sometimes with duplicative or contradictory results).171 The result is
169. ROSENBAUM, supra note 166, at 11. See also Figure 15.
170. DANIEL R. HAWKINS JR. & SARA ROSENBAUM, The Challenges Facing Health Centers
in a Changing Healthcare System, in THE FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: WHO WILL CARE
FOR THE POOR AND UNINSURED? 99 (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1998).
171. For example, the optional categorically needy children whose coverage was added to
Medicaid in 1997 as part of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) legislation
already could be covered as optional categorically needy children under §1902(r)(2) of the Act,
which had been added a decade earlier. SARA ROSENBAUM & COLLEEN SONOSKY, THE URBAN
INSTITUTE, CHILD HEALTH IN A CHANGING POLICY ENVIRONMENT: THE ROLES OF CHILD
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a horribly complicated law that leaves out nearly as many poor people as it
covers, makes coverage of the near-poor feasible but only on terms that most
states reject (very broad eligibility and no cost-sharing), supports coverage of
long-term care services but with significant lapses in the adequacy of that
coverage and the ability to furnish coverage in community settings, and
underwrites the safety net through antiquated payment mechanisms that no
longer work as they should in the modern health care environment. The
question thus becomes Medicaid’s prospects for reform.
For a number of reasons, in the absence of comprehensive national reform,
a strong case can be made for the systematic and thoughtful modernization of
Medicaid. First, the process already has begun. As this article points out, over
the past decade, Medicaid has been altered in certain basic respects to take into
account the needs and pressures created by the modern health system and
emerging health needs. Eligibility standards were revised as part of the 1996
welfare reform legislation to make possible the coverage of all families with
children on the basis of financial need alone (as defined by the states), without
regard to welfare receipt or categorical relationship to the AFDC program.172
This reform, which states have begun to use, permits a federally assisted
response to the problem of the working uninsured, which is concentrated in
lower income working families (i.e., families with incomes at or below twohundred percent of the federal poverty level).173 As Figure 16 illustrates, in
1998 more than three-quarters of uninsured non-elderly Americans were
members of working households, and more than half of these individuals were
members of families with incomes at or below two-hundred percent of the
federal poverty level.174 It is unlikely that these families will be able to secure
access to employer-sponsored coverage; indeed, firms that offer no coverage
employ the majority of uninsured workers.175 In the absence of an alternative

ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS IN ADDRESSING POLICY ISSUES (1999). In federal Medicaid
policy, duplication is a serious problem, since under the federal budget process, each addition to
Medicaid results in financial obligations which must be paid for through tax increases or
offsetting program reductions.
172. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103,
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. III. 1997)). The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act was the repeal of AFDC and replaced it with Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2210 (1996).
173. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, UNINSURED IN AMERICA 11
(2000). In 1998, when eighteen percent of all non-elderly persons were uninsured, thirty-six
percent of the poor and thirty-one percent of the near-poor were uninsured.
174. See infra Figure 16.
175. ELLEN O’BRIEN & JUDY FEDER, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, HOW WELL DOES THE EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM WORK
FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES? (1998), available at http://www.kff.org/content/archive/
2107/lowincome3.html. Only forty-three percent of low wage workers were even offered
coverage by their employers in 1996, compared to ninety-three percent of higher wage workers.
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source of affordable coverage, it is likely that many will remain uninsured, as
the welfare transition statistics presented in the previous section suggest.
Figure 16

The Nonelderly Uninsured by Poverty
Level and Family Work Status, 1998
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SOURCE: Urban Institute estimates prepared for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid
and the Uninsured, based on the March 1999 Current Population Survey.

The reform process also has grown for persons with disabilities.
Legislation enacted in 1999 further extends existing provisions of law that
permit states to provide Medicaid to persons with severe disabilities who, if
they were to return to work, would risk the loss of coverage or who, in the
absence of Medicaid coverage, would be unable to work.176 These expanded
benefits assist workers with disabilities in two ways. First, because of the
potential impact on insurance costs, employers might resist hiring individuals
with disabilities or else may impose long waiting periods for benefits. Second,
persons with disabilities who believe that they can work, and wish to do so,
nonetheless may fail to pursue employment opportunities in the absence of
Medicaid benefit protections. The 1999 reforms create additional incentives to
work without fear of major health consequences and remove a possible barrier
to employment.
Reforms also have occurred in the context of the organization and
administration of Medicaid. Medicaid has been modernized over the past two

Id. at fig.5. As equally important, when offered coverage low-wage workers are surprisingly
responsive to the offer, suggesting that employment-based health coverage is an extremely high
priority. Id. at fig. 6.
176. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 § 201(a), Pub. L. No.
106-170 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.).
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decades in the area of managed care. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and its
precursor managed care “waiver” program dating back to 1981,177 permit states
to take their programs through the same fundamental type of managed care
conversion that employer-sponsored coverage has undergone over the past two
decades.178 It is now possible to establish both basic and specialty mandatory
managed care programs for Medicaid beneficiaries, and many state agencies
are highly sophisticated purchasers of complex managed care products.179
A second reason to invest in the modernization of Medicaid has to do with
its amenability to change and the existence of an administrative infrastructure
to implement change. Were Congress to initiate entirely new programs to
address the problems identified in this article, a completely new infrastructure
would have to be put into place, a process that would push the cost of reform
up dramatically and add years to the implementation timetable.
The most important reason to modernize Medicaid is that the program is an
enormously expensive investment with vast promise but in need of a lot of
attention. Most pointedly, if Medicaid’s problems are not addressed, then
ultimately one can expect to see greater efforts to bypass Medicaid altogether
in an effort to address emerging health issues. This already has happened
once, with the 1997 enactment of the State Children’s Health Insurance Plan
(SCHIP).180 The SCHIP program can be operated as either a part of Medicaid
or else as a separate block grant program that contains nominal federal
standards and virtually no federal beneficiary protections.181 Even more
significantly perhaps, SCHIP is utterly duplicative of Medicaid in its most
fundamental respects, thereby underscoring the fact that, rather than being an
affirmative addition to the pantheon of federal interventions to emerging public
health problems, SCHIP is a “non-Medicaid” law that creates a legal
mechanism for bypassing the requirements and safeguards of the Medicaid
statute.182 All the children whom SCHIP makes eligible could already be
covered under an expanded Medicaid. 183 The services SCHIP supports are

177. Social Security Act § 1915(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b) (1994).
178. Id.
179. Sara Rosenbaum, Approaches to Assuring Quality Health Care Through State Contracts
with Managed Care Plans, in ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 223, 234 (Marsha Lillie-Blanton et al.
eds., 1999).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1397.
181. Sara Rosenbaum et. al., The Children’s Hour: The State Children’s Health Insurance
Program, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1998, at 75.
182. The price that states paid for this flexibility was a capped federal financial contribution
of $40 billion over ten years, a price that they presumably might be less willing to pay in the case
of the $100 billion per year Medicaid program.
183. SCHIP makes “targeted low-income” children eligible for assistance. Social Security
Act § 2110(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(a) (Supp. IV 1998). Under freestanding SCHIP programs,
these are children who are ineligible for Medicaid and whose family incomes are at or below

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

42

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:7

federally recognized services under Medicaid. Already there have been calls at
the highest levels184 to continue this path of duplicative health care spending
by expanding SCHIP to cover parents.185 As with the children, parents of lowincome children already can be covered under Medicaid.
What explains the enactment of SCHIP? At its core, SCHIP reflects a
desire on the part of Congress not to create new entitlement programs.186
However, the bigger question is why Congress created a new program rather
than modify Medicaid for the near poor. The answer lies in the fact that most
federal lawmakers, simply refused at the time and under the hurried
circumstances in which SCHIP was enacted, to address the deep structural
issues that must be dealt with in order to Medicaid to the near-poor. State
officials concluded that since the children targeted for assistance were nearpoor, their families could afford modest cost-sharing; furthermore, since the
program was designed to create a proxy for employer coverage,187 the benefit
package should be more limited than the extensive coverage available to the
poorest children under Medicaid. Neither of these options—using modest cost
sharing or offering a streamlined benefit package—is possible under the
traditional Medicaid program.
Whatever one’s view of Medicaid for the poor, these concerns about
Medicaid coverage of the near poor are legitimate, yet the issue was never
debated. As a result, lawmakers opted for a duplicative new program rather
than to rethink certain basic aspects of Medicaid.188
Rather than spawning more SCHIP substitutes that not only diminish
protections for vulnerable populations but also entail duplicative governmental
spending,189 the wiser course may be to thoughtfully attempt Medicaid
twice the federal poverty level. Social Security Act § 2110(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(b) (Supp. IV
1998).
184. President Clinton proposed a SCHIP expansion in the fiscal year 2001 budget and Vice
President Gore proposed SCHIP expansions as part of his Presidential campaign.
185. Id.
186. SARA ROSENBAUM & COLLEEN SONOSKY, URBAN INSTITUTE, CHILD HEALTH IN A
CHANGING POLICY ENVIRONMENT: THE ROLES OF CHILD ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS IN
ADDRESSING POLICY ISSUES (1999).
187. The SCHIP statute even speaks in terms of “benchmark coverage” which is to be
calibrated under SCHIP programs to one of several alternative employer-sponsored benefit plans.
Social Security Act § 2103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1397cc (Supp. IV 1998).
188. Added to the philosophical resistance to Medicaid reform, one of two prime sponsors of
SCHIP was Senator Edward Kennedy, who is not a member of the Senate Finance Committee,
which has jurisdiction over Medicaid. He thus had limited interest in introducing a bill that his
committee (the Senate Labor Committee) could not consider.
See generally
http://www.senate.gov (listing all members of the United States Senate Committees).
189. Because each new initiative must be paid for under the Federal Budget Act, the fact that
Medicaid already includes these potential expenditures in its budgetary “baseline” does not mean
that the Congressional Budget Office would recognize possible Medicaid savings as a cost offset
to new outlays under a separate SCHIP program. Thus, Congress effectively paid twice for
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restructuring. Rather than letting a nearly two-hundred billion dollar program
continue to lurch along under the accumulated burdens of thirty-five years of
policy “wear and tear,” there ought to be a real effort at program reform.
The areas that cry out for repair span the entire program, and the list of
items that need attention is long. But the essential thing to remember is that
while addressing these matters is complicated, Medicaid is a program of
demonstrated resilience, and none of the issues raised here is beyond
thoughtful attention and reform.
A logical place to start the Medicaid “litany of horrors” is with eligibility.
The program’s basic financial eligibility levels are extremely restrictive;
furthermore, because they are absolute, they create a steep “cliff” effect and
thus represent enormously regressive social policy. In the case of categorically
needy persons (virtually all of the expansion groups discussed in this article
fall into this classification), the fixed financial standards mean that individuals
qualify or do not qualify. With very limited exceptions, there is no incomerelated premium option under Medicaid, nor are there sufficient flexible costsharing options for near-poor families and individuals that would help states
maintain some control over program costs. While care must be taken in the
design of premiums and cost sharing in order to avoid creating of barriers to
coverage of lower income plans,190 modest premium contributions and cost
sharing would appear to be preferable to no coverage at all.
Not only are the financial eligibility levels low in relation to need, but the
standards and methodologies used to evaluate income and resources, determine
family size, and make other financial adjustments necessary to the
determination of financial eligibility are frightfully complex. They create an
unnecessarily heavy administrative burden on state and local agencies and
above all, on applicants and recipients. Additionally, they vastly increase the
potential for erroneous denials and major delays in assistance. Anyone who
has spent even a scintilla of time around the Medicaid program probably
believes that were administration made simpler, more people could be assisted
for roughly the same amount of money.
One logical response might be to permit states to adopt more generous
financial eligibility standards for all populations that at the same time permit
the use of income related premiums and modest cost sharing in the case of
SCHIP: once in the new tax revenues that were needed to support the program (in the case of
SCHIP, a tobacco tax was used) and once in the form of a Medicaid expenditure baseline that
already allowed for these outlays.
190. There is a sizable body of literature on cost-sharing and its effects on the poor that
suggests that cost sharing beyond modest levels acts as a strong deterrent to enrollment.
Nonetheless, some cost sharing undoubtedly is feasible. SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., CHIP
HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND COST SHARING: LESSONS FROM THE LITERATURE (1998).
See also SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES RELATING TO
CHIP COST SHARING PROVISIONS FOR CERTAIN TARGETED LOW INCOME CHILDREN (1999).
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near-poor individuals and families. Another option would be to allow states to
measure eligibility in accordance with simplified methodologies that lend
themselves to short applications, a limited amount of personal information, and
quick and accurate calculations. Also essential are annual enrollment
periods,191 so that Medicaid coverage is stabilized and the need for frequent
eligibility reviews is eliminated.192 The annual enrollment concept, which was
introduced into the statute for children in 1997,193 is more consistent with the
notion of Medicaid as insurance rather than welfare.
With simpler
methodologies, states could be expected to take far more aggressive steps to
design enrollment systems that are accessible in communities and that avoid
using welfare offices. Even if welfare offices were to remain responsible for
the final “stamp of approval,” their role as the site of application for assistance
should be ended.
Beyond the financial eligibility problems lie the categorical eligibility
problems. To begin with, there is no federal coverage category for nondisabled working age adults without children, a problem that has plagued states
for years. The statute cries out for the addition of an optional coverage
category that would recognize adults who are neither elderly, persons with
disabilities, or parents. The data on the working uninsured and the reality of
limited employer participation in insurance plans when the workforce is
predominantly low income more than justify this response.
The bar to categorical eligibility in the case of non-disabled adults is by no
means the only problem. Persons with disabilities face serious problems of
their own that are increasingly coming to light in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C.,194 which declared the unnecessary
institutionalization of persons with disabilities a form of discrimination under
the Americans with Disabilities Act.195 Given the importance of Medicaid in
financing long-term care, states naturally have begun to reconsider how their
Medicaid programs will need to be amended or revised to promote greater
availability of community services. Under existing Medicaid law, states can
offer expanded services and benefits using liberalized eligibility standards for
institutionalized persons as well as for persons who, but for these services,
would require institutional services covered under the state plan.196 However,

191. Under federal law, eligibility must be redetermined whenever personal circumstances
change, thereby leading many states to adopt short periods of coverage and frequent
redetermination cycles. 42 C.F.R. § 435.916(c) (1999).
192. The statute already permits twelve months continuous enrollment in the case of children,
an option to which many states have responded. Social Security Act § 1902(e)(12), 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(e)(12) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
193. Id.
194. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
195. Id. at 600.
196. Social Security Act § 1915(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (1994).
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this test creates two problems. First, persons with physical disabilities either
must go into an institution or be on the verge of doing so before they can
qualify for an alternative program.197 States would have to literally expand
their institutional coverage standards in order to qualify more persons for
community services, a step that few officials want to take. Second, persons
with mental illnesses are completely unaided by this standard, since Medicaid
excludes coverage for individuals with mental diseases. As a result, persons
with mental illnesses cannot meet a test that requires that they demonstrate that
they would reside in a Medicaid covered institution without broader
community care.
A possible option would be to allow states to set liberalized eligibility
standards for persons with disabilities who reside in communities. Costs could
be controlled through the use of case planning and active care management.
The elimination of a risk of institutionalization test would not only expand
options for aiding persons with physical disabilities but would also make
assistance more readily available to those with mental disabilities.
Furthermore, this change would appear to be enormously important in light of
the Olmstead decision, in order to minimize the potential for institutional bias
in Medicaid.
Medicaid’s extraordinary benefit package creates problems of its own.
One of the great strengths of Medicaid is its benefit structure. At the same
time, as it is currently configured, the benefit package has major drawbacks for
states that engage in large-scale managed care purchasing. Under law, all
categorically needy persons are entitled to all benefits with either nominal or
no cost sharing. While the scope of the entitlement is vital to the program’s
mission, it makes managed care purchasing and administration difficult,
because it extends so far beyond the scope of conventional managed care
products. Consequently, as states have begun to purchase managed care
products, it is clear that virtually no vendors sell products as broad as Medicaid
coverages either requires or permits. States have pursued a logical tactic of
effectively breaking up their state plans into two components: one consisting of
the managed care contract and the other consisting of residual benefits that
remain directly administered by the state.198 The result has been a hodgepodge
of state managed care agreements that vary enormously in what lies “inside”
the agreement and what lies “outside” the scope of the contract and, thus
remains a direct responsibility of the state agency.
While it is probably not possible to arrive at a single standard plan and
supplemental coverage arrangement under Medicaid that would fit all state

197. This is the practical import of the statutory test under § 1915(c) of the Social Security
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (1994).
198. SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., NEGOTIATING THE NEW HEALTH SYSTEM: A NATIONWIDE
STUDY OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1999).
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needs, it might be possible to devise several different basic and supplemental
coverage packages, much like “standard” and “high option” health plans in the
private sector. States that wished to contract with managed care vendors could
buy a standard package of primary, preventive, acute, and limited long-term
services for enrollees, while state agencies, in their insurer roles, would retain
direct responsibility for “high option” services (i.e., the remainder of the
Medicaid entitlement). Those vendors who can demonstrate added capabilities
in the provision and management of persons with long-term health service
needs could expand their contracts to include some or all of these residual
“high option” services. At the same time, the separation of the Medicaid
entitlement into its two basic coverage components (acute and long-term)
might help encourage the emergence of a more stable, better priced, national
Medicaid market that in turn would yield more products, better pricing
techniques (including tiered pricing for special populations), greater ability to
develop common data systems, and mechanisms for measuring and achieving
quality improvement.
An additional problem that would require statutory restructuring is the
issue of aid to low income Medicare beneficiaries. Under federal law,
Medicare recipients with low incomes who do not qualify for Medicaid receive
premium and cost sharing assistance only.199 Pending Medicare drug reform
proposals would extend additional coverage for prescribed drugs as well.200
An additional policy option would be to extend to low income Medicare
beneficiaries coverage for other necessary services and benefits excluded from
Medicare, particularly hearing aids and eyeglasses. If Medicare is not
expanded to cover prescribed drugs, then Medicaid coverage extension to all
lower income Medicare beneficiaries becomes particularly important.
The problem of managed care pricing puts a spotlight on providers
generally. Since Medicaid’s inception, one of its greatest problems has been
low participation by private providers, a situation fueled at least in part by low
payment levels. While it is not at all clear that better rates would bring a
multitude of providers into the program, payment reforms fashioned after those
used in Medicare and designed to bring Medicaid payments up to at least
Medicare levels might create at least modest program participation incentives,
particularly as eligibility expands.
It is also clear that in light of continuing high levels of uninsurance, it is
important to address the needs of safety net providers. Federally funded
community health centers, public hospitals, and local public health agencies
that furnish medical care are facing a huge rise in the number of uninsured

199. See supra text accompanying note 63.
200. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE FOR
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF SELECTED PROPOSALS (2000),
available at http://www.kff.org.
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patients they treat. As noted previously, between 1990 and 1997, the
proportion of uninsured patients treated at health centers rose at a rate twice
that for the non-elderly uninsured population as a whole.201 While Medicaid
typically pays steeply discounted rates to health providers,202 Medicaid’s
disproportionate share (“DSH”) payment policy for high volume indigent care
hospitals and the cost-related payment policy for health centers have at least in
theory averted the imposition of such steep discounts in the case of safety net
providers which cannot absorb the impact of deeply discounted payments
without cutting into other funds intended for care of the uninsured. 203
Unfortunately, neither policy is working well.204
In the case of DSH, the current formula is so loose that states can divert
much of the DSH funding they receive to hospitals with modest indigent care
burdens, leaving highly stressed facilities with only limited aid. In the case of
health centers, the cost based payment system if set to sunset in FY 2004205
and many states have resisted adherence to the policy.206 Moreover, both
health centers and public hospitals actively participate in managed care and,
like other providers, have had to provide steep discounts to companies as a
condition of network participation. Thus, the combination of these three
factors—the rising number of uninsured, the effects of a competitive health
system, and only limited relief under Medicaid’s special payment rules—have
combined to create serious problems for the safety net.207
One logical step might be creation of federalized Medicaid payment
policies for safety net providers that offset managed care discounts and ensure
that revenues meant for the care of the uninsured are not diverted into
Medicaid revenue offsets. A federally funded annual payment supplement
could be allocated directly to institutions and clinics whose uninsured patient
caseloads exceed specified minimum standards. Another option would be to
continue, expand, and refine the existing policy of mandatory state payment
supplements to safety net institutions, although such an option probably would
be the less attractive because of state resistance to federally mandated payment
201. See supra Figure 15.
202. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 20 (reporting that in 1989 Medicaid
payments to physicians averaged 73.7% of Medicare payment rates).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 89-99. For a comprehensive review of the problems
that safety net providers face under Medicaid, see COMM. ON THE CHANGING MARKET,
MANAGED CARE, AND THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF SAFETY NET PROVIDERS, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET: INTACT BUT ENDANGERED (Marion Ein
Lewind & Stuart Altman eds., 2000) [hereinafter INTACT BUT ENDANGERED].
204. Id.
205. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(13)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (1994).
206. See, e.g., Letter from National Governor’s Association, to Congress (July 2000)
(opposing continuation of special payment policies for federally qualified health centers).
207. INTACT BUT ENDANGERED, supra note 203, ch. 3. For a synopsis of these findings see
the Executive Summary. Id. at 1.
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levels. The federal government has a history of providing financial support for
the provision of health services in underserved communities;208 a federally
administered system of direct payment supplements is consistent with this
history and has been recommended by at least one national study.209
A final issue that needs to be addressed is the federal/state allocation of
financial responsibilities. This issue has been debated in one form or another
since Medicaid’s enactment. Currently the federal government bears
approximately fifty-five percent of the financial responsibility for the
program.210 The issue is whether this level of financial contribution should be
increased, either by some percentage, or to a level needed to fully underwrite
the cost of one or more aspects of the program. Arguments for expanded
federal financial role relate to the question of which part of government—the
federal government or state governments—is in the best position to bear the
burden of social welfare expenditures (in this case, health care) that rise more
rapidly than the general inflation rate. Given the limited ability of state
governments to respond to rapid escalations in health costs, the most logical
step might be to have the federal government assume responsibility for a
significantly higher share of Medicaid program costs, while leaving states with
reduced financial exposure but a sufficient investment to continue to play a
partnering role in service delivery, program design, and quality improvement.
This expanded federal financial role also might encourage states to support
those restructuring costs that entail significant outlays.
Beyond the issue of sorting out financial responsibilities, several other
matters affect the prospects for resolution of these major Medicaid reform
issues. There are three major issues. The first is finding the money and
dealing with the federal budget process. The second is addressing the
ideological opposition to strengthening and modernizing an entitlement
program. The third is opposition to strengthening a direct government benefit
program rather than using market solutions such as tax credits for the purchase
of private insurance.
The 1974 Budget Act imposes a series of conventions on Congressional
deliberations of budgetary matters that fall with particular harshness on general

208. Examples of this tradition are the health centers program as well as other programs
authorized and funded under the Public Health Service Act and Social Security Act, including the
Title V Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant, (Title V of the Social Security Act); the
Ryan White Care Act (Title XXIII of the Public Health Service Act); and the National Health
Service Corps (Title III of the Public Health Service Act).
209. INTACT BUT ENDANGERED, supra note 203.
210. The federal medical assistance percentage may not be less than fifty percent nor higher
than eighty-three percent. Social Security Act § 1903(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
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revenue entitlement programs such as Medicaid.211 Entitlement spending
reforms cannot proceed unless paid for. This means that Congress must, as part
of a budget resolution, approve significant new levels of Medicaid spending
before debate on the matter can proceed and legislation can be enacted. As of
summer 2000, the projected federal surplus over the next ten years exceeded
four trillion dollars.212 However, nearly half that amount would be dedicated
to the Social Security system or debt reduction, and calls for tax relief,
Medicare drug reform, and other national priorities may leave little money for
other activities.213 It is impossible to say what the ten-year cost of the
Medicaid reforms discussed in this article would amount to, but it is evident
that the cost could be significant. This is particularly true for reforms aimed at
expanding and simplifying eligibility (the managed care-related benefit and
safety net reforms probably would carry relatively minor price tags, because
the reforms primarily involve restructuring the manner in which existing funds
are spent).
The second and third problems—opposition to entitlements and preference
for tax solutions—are intertwined. It is clearly the entitlement nature of the
program that gives Medicaid its basic stature as “insurance.” The legal
entitlement is what permits the Census Bureau to count recipients as “insured,”
since the essence of insurance is the ability to enforce individual contractual
expectations (or in this case, statutory entitlements). Otherwise the benefits
amount to simple largesse.214
It is true that with entitlements come enforceable legal expectations (and
ultimately lawsuits). But this is no different from the legal expectations that
privately insured individuals have. Were one to count all of the insurance
lawsuits ever brought, they would probably dwarf those brought under
Medicaid. The fact is, if the nation wants to “insure” people, then it needs to
give individuals the legal tools they need to secure the services and benefits
they are promised.

211. 2 U.S.C. § 900. For a brief explanation of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which
tightened up on entitlement budgeting procedures and its “paygo” requirements (which preclude
expansion of direct spending programs such as Medicaid without identified sources of revenue),
see http://www.usbr.gov/laws/bea.html.
212. Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Tax Plan: The Debate Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES, August
26, 2000, at A1.
213. Id.
214. In that vein, we think that it is worth pointing out that it is not at all clear that children
enrolled in freestanding SCHIP programs can be counted as insured or simply as recipients of
subsidized health care, since as a matter of law the federal SCHIP statute specifies that it creates
no individual entitlement. The George Washington University Center for Health Services
Research and Policy, which Professor Rosenbaum directs, is currently in the process of
examining the legal documents for freestanding state SCHIP programs to determine whether they
create enforceable legal rights under state law.
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Furthermore, a tax credit is as much an entitlement as Medicaid.
Extending tax credits to lower income individuals would create a tax
entitlement. In the case of health care, it is not at all clear that tax entitlements
are less expensive.215 Furthermore, using the tax code as a mechanism for
achieving better health coverage of lower income families and persons with
disabilities creates additional problems. Such an approach would leave
beneficiaries without a program administration mechanism and would by
definition rely on the market for millions of individuals who, as this article
points out, either work for employers that do not participate in the health
market or else fall outside of the market. Finally, the issue of Medicaid versus
tax credits may also be a distinction without a difference today, since in the
case of working age adults and their children, so many states purchase
managed care products.
Some may see a problem of private insurance “crowd out”216 (that is,
substituting public benefits for private benefits) in expanding Medicaid to
cover greater numbers of working families. This option already exists in
Medicaid; the question is whether it should be expanded. Furthermore,
whether or not the “crowd-out” phenomenon is real (some research suggests
that very little substitution actually occurs), the problem is no less present for
tax expansions than is the case for direct expenditure reforms.217 Moreover,
were government to provide the health coverage subsidy for lower income
workers, employers that now subsidize coverage might in fact invest savings in
greater levels of wages and compensation, a not unwelcome outcome.
Finally, there are those who would object to Medicaid expansion on the
ground that it stigmatizes the poor. Despite concerns about the “stigma” of
Medicaid, two recent studies suggest that the opposite may be true.218 When
asked about Medicaid, lower income families consistently cite its value and
desirability.219 Moreover, when the real barriers to Medicaid enrollment are
explored in detail, at least one study suggests that the true problems lie in how
states administer their programs, not how people view themselves for being
enrolled in Medicaid.220

215. Jonathan Gruber & Larry Levitt, Tax Subsidies for Health Insurance: Costs and Benefits,
HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 75.
216. Lara Shore-Sheppard et al., Medicaid and Crowding Out of Private Insurance: A Reexamination Using Firm Level Data, 19 J. OF HEALTH ECON. 61 (2000).
217. Id.
218. MICHAEL PERRY, ET AL., THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, MEDICAID AND CHILDREN OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO ENROLLMENT: FINDINGS
FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY (2000), available at http://www.kff.org.
219. Id.
220. JENNIFER STUBER ET AL., BEYOND STIGMA: WHAT BARRIERS ACTUALLY AFFECT THE
DECISIONS OF LOW INCOME FAMILIES TO ENROLL IN MEDICAID? (2000).
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In the end, Medicaid reform is a matter of political consensus and will.
The changes set forth in this article are modest in cost next to that which would
form the establishment of an entirely new program were to be launched. Each
proposed reform is logical in that it builds on existing aspects of the program
and could be enacted with relative ease. Given the importance of Medicaid for
uninsurable populations and services, it is virtually impossible to conceive of
the American health system without the program, unless vast new economic
investments and extensive regulation of the private insurance market are
adapted. These are most unlikely events. Concerns about entitlement
expansion, crowd-out, and government intrusion could just as easily be raised
about tax proposals. With respect to the concern about entitlements, there is
little that can be done to avoid this problem if the goal of the reform exercise is
insurance or its equivalent. Whatever the outcome, it is evident that in the
absence of a unified national system, the modernization of Medicaid will be a
dominant theme in the next phase of health reform.
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